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I. INTRODUCTION
It is doubtful that any legal theory has generated more speculation,
discussion, and skepticism among American cases and commentators in the
20th century than the theory of transient personal jurisdiction. Whether a state
court can, in compliance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law,
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose only
connection with the forum state is having the misfortune of being personally
served with process while temporarily or "transitorily" present within the
forum, has been the subject of vigorous debate since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.1
The debate that followed the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Shaffer
v. Heitner2 serves as a testimonial that the American legal community was
uncertain as to the viability of the rule which some commentators claim traces
its roots through colonial America to the English common law.3 Many
commentators have firmly declared that the decisional law of the Supreme
Court has abrogated the transient rule,4 while others have argued that in-state
personal service is the most traditional and straightforward method of obtaining
personal jurisdiction over any defendant and squarely comports with due
process of law.5 The remaining commentators who have tackled the subject
1 See generally 1 HENRY C. BLACK, LAW OF JuDGMENTS 276-77 (1891); JOSEPH
SroRY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 543, 914-15 (1846); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, 7he Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE LJ. 289 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 28 (1986).
2 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3 See STORY, supra note 1. But see Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 298.
4 See, e.g., Daniel 0. Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient
Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L. REV. 38 (1979); ROBERT C. CASAD,
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 2.04(2)(c) (1983); Donald W. Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner:
The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY LJ. 739
(1977); Bruce Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judcial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and
the Abolition ofthe "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY LJ. 729 (1981); David H. Vernon, Single
Factor Bases of In Personam Personal Jurisdiction-A Speculation of the Impact of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 273 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal
Jursdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. LJ. 1 (1982); Jeffrey E. Glen, An Analysis of
"Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 607
(1979); Earl M. Matz, Sovereign Authority, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case
for the Doctrine of TransientJursdiction, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1988).
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appear to reserve judgment, characterizing the conflict as too volatile and
unertain.6
The objective of this Note is to survey the cases and comments leading up
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Burnham v. Superior Court of
Caifornia7 that purportedly settles the issue in favor of the continuing vitality
of the transient rule of personal jurisdiction. In addition to analyzing the
Burnham decision, this Note will explore the rationale buttressing the decision
and arguments against its outcome. A thorough summary of the Supreme Court
decisions leading up to Burnham, as well as a careful examination of their
impact on the transient jurisdiction controversy, will be provided. Furthermore,
analysis, ranging from thoughtful speculation to well-grounded theories,
concerning the fairness of the transient rule, the probable effects the Burnham
decision will have on the future of personal jursdiction jurisprudence, and the
emerging importance of judicially created doctrines such as forum non
conveniens, will be presented. Finally, an attempt will be made to assess the
impact of Burnham toward answering the question: Is Burnham the "final
word" on transient personal jurisdiction?
I. THE IDEAL FACT PATrERN OF BURNHAM
It all began simply enough. Dennis and Francie Burnham, two New Jersey
residents, came to a mutual conclusion that it was time for their marriage of 11
years to come to an end. It was agreed that Francie, who intended to move to
California, should file for divorce on grounds of "irreconcilable differences"
and retain custody of the couples' two children. However, Dennis later became
dissuaded that their "agreement" was the best course of action. Subsequently,
Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey state court on the grounds of
"desertion." Meanwhile, Mrs. Burnham, unaware that the New Jersey suit was
pending, filed for divorce in California state court pursuant to the agreement.
Shortly after Mrs. Burnham filed for divorce, Mr. Burnham travelled to
Southern California on business. Upon completion of his business, Mr.
Burnham decided to drive north to the San Francisco Bay area to visit with his
children who were living with Mrs. Burnham. He took his oldest child to San
Francisco for the weekend. Upon returning his child to Mrs. Burnham's home,
Mr. Burnham was met by Mrs. Burnham's attorney who promptly served him
with a California court summons and a copy of his wife's divorce petition. Mr.
Burnham, with summons in hand, thereafter boarded a plane and returned to
New Jersey.
6 Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Lidtations on State Court
Jurfiction, 1980 SUP. Cr. REv. 77 (1980).
7 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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Mr. Burnham made a special appearance in California state court, moving
to quash the service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction. He argued that because he was a nonresident and his only contacts
with the State of California were a few short business trips and the one trip to
visit his children, he lacked any substantial "minimum contacts" with the
forum. In essence, Mr. Burnham argued that a court could not, consistent with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on in-state personal
service of process. Mr. Burnham maintained that transient personal jurisdiction
no longer comported with due process.
The Superior Court denied the motion, and the California Court of Appeal
denied mandamus relief, rejecting Burnham's "minimum contacts," due
process argument. The Superior Court held it to be "a valid jurisdictional
predicate for inpersonam jurisdiction" that the "defendant [was] present in the
forum state and personally served with process." 8
For the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to squarely confront and
resolve the controversy surrounding the doctrine of transient personal
jurisdiction.9 Based in part upon conflicting lower court decisions and upon the
heated debate following Shaffer, the Court granted certiorari to settle the
matter.10
Before discussing the role that the Burnham decision plays in the transient
jurisdiction fray, a generalized discussion of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
is in order. The following sections survey the historical development of judicial
jurisdiction, the mechanics of personal jurisdiction, and the inherent due
process considerations.
8 Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 5, Burnham v. Superior Court of California,
495 U.S. 604 (1990). See also 110 S.Ct. at 2109.
9 Part of the confusion surrounding the doctrine of transient in personam jurisdiction
can be contributed to the absence of a Supreme Court decision that directly addressed the
issue. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS § 8 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1978). Almost all Supreme Court decisions involving in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants also involved out-of-state service of process. It appears that Burnhwn
was the first case granted certiorari upon which personal jurisdiction over a nonresident was
grounded solely upon in-state service of process.
10 493 U.S. 807 (1989).
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III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. The Historical Development of Personal Jurisdiction: The American
Eperience
The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void can
be traced to 15th century English common law antecedents. H As early as 1814,
American courts honored this common law rule and implanted the idea of
judicial jurisdiction into the American legal system. 12 Many decades before the
Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, American courts held
that the judgments of courts lacking jurisdiction over the cause of action were
void and unenforceable. 13
In 1868, a new element was added to the judicial jurisdiction analysis with
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause mandates that no person may be denied
"life, liberty or property without due process of law." 14 Initially applied to
jurisdiction over the cause of action, 15 the Supreme Court in 1878 announced
that the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction also violated the Due
Proces Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Since Pennoyer v. Neff,'17 all
state court assertions of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process of
law.
B. Pennoyer v. Neff: A Benchmark for Personal Jurisdiction and Due
Process
Every discussion of personal jurisdiction must begin with the landmark
Supreme Court decision in Pennoyer v. Neff. With Pennoyer, the Court spelled
out the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
11 See, e.g., Bowser v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (1482).
12 See, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 45 (1814).
13 See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (no. 11, 134) (CC Mass. 1828); Dunn v.
Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336
(1850).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
15 Jurisdiction over the cause of action is commonly known as subject matter
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the parties to the cause of action, or personal jurisdiction, is a
separate consideration under American law. Early English decisions collapsed the two
notions into the theory ofjudicial jurisdiction or coram judice ("before ajudge"). According
to 18th century English common law, jurisdiction over the cause of action was the
beginning and the end of the inquiry. Jurisdiction was proper wherever the defendant could
be found. See STORY, supra note 1, at § 543, 914-15.
16 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878).
17 Id.
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personal jurisdiction, to wit "proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute [Fourteenth Amendment] due process of law." 18
It follows that decisions rendered by a court without jurisdiction violate due
process and are therefore void and without effect. According to the Court, the
traditional method of obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
consisted of personal service of process upon the defendant within the
boundaries of the forum state. 19
It must be noted that the Pennoyer Court adopted a sovereignty or "power"
approach to jurisdiction. Each state was considered a sovereign unit and had
the "power" to exercise jurisdiction over all persons and property within its
boundaries. As a consequence, "the tribunals of one State [had] no jurisdiction
over persons beyond its limits." 20 Furthermore, the Court held that "[p]rocess
from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon
parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against
them."2 ' Therefore, after Pennoyer, each state had the "power" to exercise in
personam jurisdiction22 over any defendant, resident or nonresident, who was
personally served with process while present in the state. Furthermore, each
state had the "power" to exercise in rem jurisdiction over any property within
the state. A state, however, had no "power" to adjudicate a claim against a
nonresident concerning personal rights and obligations if the nonresident could
not be served in the state. Such a proceeding would violate due process and
usurp the "power" of the state in which the defendant could be served.3
18 Id. at 733 (due process defined as "a course of legal proceedings according to those
rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the
protection and enforcement of private rights").
19 Id. at 733. It appears that the Court believed due process to require in-state service.
When a suit involved the personal liability of a nonresident, as opposed to a determination
concerning property located within the forum state, the Court ruled that due process
requires that the defendant be served in states or submit to a voluntary (presumably general)
appearance. The exercise of personal jurisdiction via long-arm statutes and out-of-state
service procedures were not respected by the Court in the Pennoyer-era.
20 Id. at 731.
21 Id. at 727.
22 In personam jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over the person, is one of several types of
personal jurisdiction and gives a court power to issue a judgment against a defendant
personally. In rem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over a thing, is yet another type of personal
jurisdiction and gives a court power to adjudicate a claim concerning a piece of property or
about a status. Finally, quasi in rem jurisdiction, concerns an adjudication as to the interests
of specific individuals in a piece of property. Jurisdiction is exercised by attaching the
property as a pretext to reaching the interests of individuals in the property. For a discussion
of the various types of personal jurisdiction see, Bernstine, supra note 4. See also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).
23 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727, 729.
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C. International Shoe: The Abrogation of the Power Theory of Personal
Jurisdiction
Following Pennoyer, courts subscribed to the "power" rationale as a guide
to exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 24 States could
exercise jurisdiction upon any defendant who had the misfortune of being
served while present in the state where an action had been brought. The
fortunate defendants were those nonresidents who could not be found within
the forum state, for it was those defendants the court could not reach. Service
of process across state lines violated due process because it usurped the
sovereign "power" of other states. Consequently, any resulting decision was
rendered void and unenforceable. Understandably, an abyss developed into
which the rights of plaintiffs seeking to bring suit against nonresident
defendants periodically disappeared. If the nonresident could not be personally
served while present in the forum and, in addition, owned no property in the
forum over which the plaintiff could exercise jurisdiction, then the nonresident
was essentially protected against being sued in the forum.25
As the "power" theory became increasingly disfavored by the states in the
early 20th century,26 changes in transportation and communication technology,
accompanied by the tremendous growth of interstate commerce, led to an
"inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction" over
nonresidents. 27 States began to develop substitute service of process methods to
reach nonresidents and hale them into the forum state.28 Finally, the Supreme
Court announced the demise of the "power" theory of Pennoyer in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington:
24 See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 1. Professor Ehrenzweig cites the
RE SATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 77-78 (1934) as the general rule prevailing in
American jurisdictions at the time of International Shoe: "transitory actions" may be
brought in any court that has jurisdiction of the defendant, and anyone "personally present"
in the state is subject to its jurisdiction, "whether he is permanently or only temporarily
there."
25 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Black, I., dissenting).
26 See, e.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927). Following Pennoyer, states became disgruntled by the fact that they could not
reach the nonresident motorist who, after causing injury within the forum, simply drove
beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the state to prevent in-state service. Therefore, the
Court was inclined to abandon the unworkable "power" theory and restate the due process
requirements to incorporate out-of-state service upon nonresidents.
27 Hanson, 357 U.S at 260.
28 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1916) (nonresident motorists act subjected
nonresidents to jurisdiction of Massachusetts under implied consent theory).
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Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad
respondendum 9 has given way to personal service of summons or other form
of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, /f he be notpresent within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 30
Although International Shoe signaled the end of the "power" theory, it did not
render Pennoyer completely inoperative. Notice that the above quoted language
appears to exempt transient jurisdiction from the minimum contacts standard.
Under a strict interpretation of this language, exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over any defendant served while "present within the territory of the
forum" would not be required to surmount the "minimum contacts" inquiry.
However, such a close reading appears to be counterintuitive given the Court's
emphasis on "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 31 For
example, the Court restates the "fair play and substantial justice" principle in
more sweeping terms at the close of the International Shoe opinion:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the State has no
contacts, ties, or relations. 32
Thus, a controversy as to the continuing validity of Pennoyer was born.
Reading the literal language of the decision results in conflicting outcomes. At
first glance, it appears the Court intended the "minimum contacts" standard to
play no role in exercising personal jurisdiction over the nonresident who is
personally served within the forum state.33 Upon further reading, one must
ponder whether the Court intended the "minimum contacts" standard to govern
the entire area surrounding the exercise of state court jurisdiction over
29 Capias ad respondendum refers to a judicial writ by which actions at law were
frequently commenced; and which commands the sheriff to take and hold the defendant
until the day of trial to answer to the plaintiff's complaint. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 188
(5th ed. 1979).
3 0 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (emphasis added)).
31 ld.
32 326 U.S. at 319 (1945).
33 See supra note 30.
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nonresident defendants given the "fairness" requirements of Fourteenth
Amendment due process.
Perhaps the best technique for appraising the impact of the International
Shoe decision is to examine the decisions that were handed down in subsequent
years. One cannot get a true grasp of the importance of the controversy that
followed the decision without searching the decisions attempting to apply the
new "minimum contacts" standard. Furthermore, it is only by examining the
ensuing case law that one can begin to distill the enduring rule of International
Shoe.
D. Due Process Decisions Following in the Wake of International Shoe
With the due process decisions that followed in the wake of International
Shoe, the Supreme Court concerned itself with focusing upon, and refining the
effect of, the minimum contacts rule. As the states became increasingly creative
in extending the jurisdiction of their courts to nonresident defendants that could
not be physically served within the state, the boundaries of due process became
obfuscated. 34 As a result, the preoccupation with the extremes of personal
jurisdiction and due process shifted the focus from traditional methods (i.e.
personal in-state service) to ruling upon the validity of the various long-arm
procedures. Therefore, paramount significance was given to the application of
the "minimum contacts" standard.
An illustration of this phenomenon can be drawn from the Court's decision
in Hanson v. Denckla.35 The Court ruled that: "However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the "minimum contacts" with that State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." 36 In support of this
proposition, the Court cited International Shoe.37 As mentioned above,
however, the decisions that followed International Shoe were concerned almost
exclusively with the validity of out-of-state service procedures and not those
methods by which the nonresident was served in-state. Furthermore, the post-
International Shoe decisions typically concerned jurisdiction over nonresident
34 See, e.g., McGee v. Intenational Life Ins. Co., 35 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
35 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
3 6 Id. at 251.
37 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. It should be noted that the Court referred to the
"sweeping" language that makes no exemption for those defendants personally served in-
state ("[The due process clause] does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relations"). The question remains whether in-state service serves as a
sufficient contact.
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corporate defendants as opposed to individuals.38 Therefore, these decisions
provide negligible insight into the true impact of International Shoe and the
"minimum contacts" test of due process upon the continuing validity of
transient personal jursdiction.
E. Shaffer v. Heitner: The Demise of Pennoyer?
As mentioned above, States scrambled in the wake of International Shoe to
enact long-arm statutes providing for substitute service of process39 over
nonresident defendants who neither owned property, nor could be personally
served, within the state. Decisions following International Shoe derived from
its standard the general rule that states could dispense with in-state personal
service on nonresident defendants in suits arising out of their activities, or
"minimum contacts," within the State.4° Confusion over the continued vitality
of Pennoyer's in-state service and in rem jurisdiction rules, however, persisted.
The culmination of this confusion resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner.41
In Shaffer, a plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware
against, inter alia, twenty-eight present and former corporate directors of
Greyhound Corp., a business incorporated under the laws of Delaware. 42
Plaintiff filed a motion to sequester stock of the Delaware corporation owned
by the defendants. 43 Under Delaware law, the situs of any stock issued from
any Delaware corporation was regarded as within the State of Delaware.44 In
essence, the plaintiff sought to establish personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants in the Delaware state court by seizing the property of
the nonresidents located within the state. The suit was brought as a quasi in
rem proceeding based on attachment or seizure of property present in the
jurisdiction so that a court may exercise jurisdiction over the interests of
specific individuals in the property. The suit did not concern the property, but
38 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39 Substitute service of process is any service other than personal service upon the
defendant. The term includes service by mail or publication. The typical long-arm statute
provides for out of state service of process upon nonresident defendants that have sufficient
contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction complies with the
rule spelled out in International Shoe and due process. For an example of the application of
long-arm statutes and due process analysis, see, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator Corp.,
176 N.E.2d 761 (. 1961).
40 See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1984).
41 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4 2 d. at 189.
43 Id. at 192.
44 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 169 (1975).
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the property served merely as a pretext to exercising in personam jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendants. 45 The success or failure of the plaintiff's quasi
in rem theory of jurisdiction depended in part upon the Court's acceptance of
the continuing validity of Pennoyer's presence of property rationale.46
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Court refused to uphold the exercise of quasi
in rem jurisdiction.
The Court mounted a serious assault on the continuing application of
Pennoyer when it stated that "[it] is clear, therefore, that the law of state-court
jurisdiction no longer stands securely on the foundation established in
Pennoyer."47 In this vein, the Court ruled that the "relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the State on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, [has become] the
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction." 48 In support of this
conclusion, the Court recited the sweeping language of the International Shoe
decision that suggests the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident cannot
comport with due process when the nonresident "has no contacts, ties, or
relations" with the forum. 49
Perhaps the most critical announcement of the Court in Shaffer was that the
"standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests
of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts
standard elucidated in International Shoe."50 Finally, the Court announced that
"all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 51 This oft-quoted
rule can be analogized to the destruction of the last remaining flood gate that
kept the surge of controversy concerning transient personal jurisdiction at bay.
Many commentators 52 and a few lower courts53 (and most likely a slew of
law professors) haled Shaffer as mandating the death of transient jurisdiction.
45 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 196-97. As to the relationship among the various types of
personal jurisdiction, see supra note 23.
46 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878) ("the exercise of the jurisdiction which
every State is admitted to possess over persons and property within its own territory will
often affect persons and property without it").
47 Slzqer, 433 U.S. at 206.
48 Id. at 204.
49 Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
50 Id. at 207.
51 Id. at 212. In a footnote to the quoted language, the Court stated that it would not be
"fruitful" to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the Shaffer
standard in cases decided on the rationale of Pennoyer. Furthermore, the Court stated that
"[to] the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled."
Id. at 212, n. 39.
52 See supra notes 1-5. See also Frank R. Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of
Swmwons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REV. 505 (1978).
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This conclusion cannot be based on the specific facts of Shaffer because
transient jurisdiction was not an issue. In addition, such a conclusion cannot be
based upon careful reading of Shaffer purporting to apply the International
Shoe standard to all exercises of state court jurisdiction. As stated above, the
International Shoe Court specifically exempted in-state service of process from
the "minimum contacts" standard. 54 What most commentators base this
conclusion upon is not so much a literal reading of Shaffer, but a reading as to
what the Shaffer rationale stands for and its place among the modem "trend" of
Supreme Court jurisdiction decisions. 55
Shaffer is a critical decision in that it represents what most commentators
regard as the fall of the last remaining vestige of Pennoyer. Critics of the
continuing validity of transient jurisdiction believe that International Shoe
destroyed the "power" rule of Pennoyer. In addition, these same commentators
believe that Shaffer destroyed the "presence" doctrine of Pennoyer.56 Such is
the basic argument of Mr. Burnham in the subject case of this Note. The
sections that follow discuss the issues raised by Burnham's argument and the
support that such an argument enjoys. In addition, the decision of the Court
will be discussed from the perspective of Justice Scalia, the author of the
plurality opinion.
IV. THE CONTINUING VALIDiTY OF PENNOYER AND TRANSIENT
PERSONAL JURISDICTON
A. Hearing Without Listening: The Argunent Against the Continuing
Validity of Transient Personal Jurisdiction
It was upon the Court's due process decisions discussed above that
Burnham rested his argument that mere service of process upon a nonresident
defendant while temporarily present in the forum state was an insufficient basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.57 Burnham traced the Court's decisional law from Pennoyer to
International Shoe, culminating in Shaffer for the proposition that "all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated by the standard set forth
in International Shoe and its progeny." 58 Burnham argued that in the absence
53 See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42 (1985); Harold Pitman Co.
v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305 (1986); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 1079 (1978); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653 (1985).
54 See upra note 30 and accompanying text.
55 See CAsAD, supra note 4, at § 2.05.
56 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57 See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
58 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum, a nonresident
defendant can be subjected to judgments only as to matters that arise out of or
relate to his or her contacts with the state.59
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, stated that Burnham's argument
rested upon a "thorough misunderstanding of our cases." 60 It is apparent from
the commentators and lower court opinions cited throughout this Note that
Burnham was not alone in laboring under such a "thorough
misunderstanding." 61
B. The Propagation of the "Thorough Misunderstanding" Regarding
Transient Jurisdiction
The Burnham plurality more than suggests that the debate concerning the
continued vitality of transient jurisdiction constitutes an unavailing exercise in
academic gymnastics. In this vein, the Court states that it has no knowledge of
"a single state or federal statute, or a single judicial decision resting upon state
law, that has abandoned in-state service as a basis of jurisdiction." 62 Of the
decisions that have pronounced the death of transient jurisdiction on the basis
that the Court's due process decisions render the practice unconstitutional, the
Court states that the decisions should be disregarded as erroneous. 63 Finally,
Scalia states that the proposition that in-state service on a nonresident defendant
is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant is "unfaithful to
both elementary logic and the foundations of our due process jurisprudence." 64
Taken as a whole, these strong statements of "black letter" beg the
question that is the heart of this Note. At what point did the "thorough
misunderstanding" concerning the questionable validity of the transient
jurisdiction rule arise? If the doctrine is so assuredly sufficient under the rules
spelled out in the Court's due process decisions, then why has the transient rule
been the subject of such heated debate? It is apparent that a chronological re-
evaluation of the evolutionary path of Supreme Court due process decisional
law, as related to transient jurisdiction, is in order. Fortunately, Justice Scalia
provides a guided tour of this path in the Burnham decision.
59 Bwnham, 495 U.S. at 610 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).
60 Id.
61 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
62 495 U.S. at 615. The Court cited several recent cases that reaffirm the doctrine of
transient jurisdiction, including Oxman's Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d 285
(Wis. 1979); Lockert v. Breedlove, 361 S.E.2d 581 (N.C. 1987); EI-Maksoud v. El-
Maksoud, 568 A.2d 140 (NJ. Super. 1989).
63 495 U.S. at 615.
64 Id. at 619.
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C. Pennoyer Revisited
Recall that at the time of Pennoyer, presence of a party litigant (for present
purposes, the nonresident defendant) was an unequivocal prerequisite to the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction by a state court. States were sovereign
entities and had "power" to exercise jurisdiction over any person or thing
located within the state. Hence, the transient rule of personal jurisdiction was
"among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in
American tradition." 65
Scalia points out that "not one American case from the period [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] (or not one American case until 1978) held, or even
suggested, that in-state personal service on an individual was insufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction." 66 Therefore, a nonresident defendant would be
well advised, at least during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to avoid
being served while passing through the state in which a summons could be
waiting.
D. International Shoe and Its Progeny Revisited
Most commentators who argue for the extinction of transient jurisdiction
trace the foundations for their arguments to International Shoe.67 The Court,
there, made the first significant inroads upon the time-honored doctrines of
Pennoyer. It was held that presence or consent were not necessarily required by
due process for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.
States were no longer required to adhere to the unbending territorial limits on
jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer.68 The Court announced a new standard for
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. State
courts could exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents, whether served while
present in the forum or not, provided the nonresident had "certain minimum
contacts" with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
65 Id. at 610. The early American traditional view provided that each state has the
power to exercise jurisdiction over any individual who could be found within its borders,
and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him with
process, the state could retain jurisdiction no matter how temporary the defendant's visit
might be. See generally, Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63 (Conn. 1793); Barrel v. Benjamin, 15
Mass. 354 (1819).
66 495 U.S. at 613. Commentators were also in seemingly unanimous agreement on
the point. See, e.g., 1 HENRY C. BLACK, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 276-77 (1891); 1
ABRAHAM C. FREEMAN, LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 470-71 (1873); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFuCr OF LAWS, §§ 77-78 (1934).67 See Ehrenzweig, siqra note 24.
68 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 69 It would appear that
due process required that the "minimum contacts" test be surmounted. It is
with this misstatement of the International Shoe rule that the "thorough
misunderstanding" was conceived.70
Scalia points out that "nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have
followed it [suggests]... that a defendant's presence in the foram... is itself
no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction." 71 The reasoning behind such a
bold and unqualified statement results from Scalia's meticulous reading of the
International Shoe decision. First, the minimum contacts standard enunciated in
International Shoe expressly exempts in-state service of process upon
nonresident defendants from its operation.72 Second, the issue of transient
jurisdiction was not addressed in International Shoe. There, the Court was
dealing with the measures required to support "novel procedures" for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Specifically,
the Court was addressing the due process considerations inherent in exercising
in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents who could not be served within the
state.73 Third, International Shoe concerned the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation, not the individual (although the
standard announced treats both types of defendants similarly). Finally, as Scalia
points out, jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of the American legal system that
defines the due process standard of "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." That standard was developed by analogy to "physical
presence," and it would be "perverse" to say it could now be turned against
that "touchstone of jurisdiction. "74
The major importance of the International Shoe standard is the general
proposition that a state may dispense with in-state personal service on
nonresident defendants in suits arising out of their activities in the state. The
defendant's litigation related contacts may take the place of physical presence as
the basis of jurisdiction. The announcement of alternative methods of meeting
due process requirements, however, was not intended to abrogate those
methods that have satisfied the requirements since Pennoyer. "[That which], in
substance, has been immemorially the actual law of the land... [is] due
process of law." 75 It is clear that the transient rule of in personam jurisdiction
survived International Shoe.
69 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
71 495 U.S. at 619.
72 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (minimum contacts insures due
process against nonresident "if he be not present within the territory of the forum").
73 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
74 495 U.S. at 619.
75 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884).
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E. Shaffer: The Source of Divergence
The primary source of disagreement concerning the continued
constitutionality of the transient rule can be traced to Shaffer v. Heitner. It was
in Shaffer that the Court announced that "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny." 76 Upon this statement of the law,
Burnham grounds his argument. In effect, Burnham argues that any remaining
vestiges of Pennoyer's transient jurisdiction rule were extinguished by the
Court in Shaffer.77 Burnham, joined by several lower court decisions and
prominent commentators on the subject, argued that the International Shoe
"minimum contacts" standard now constitutes the general rule governing the
requirements of due process. 78 No court may exercise in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant has certain minimum
contacts with the forum so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 79 Given the
misinterpretation of the International Shoe rule itself, it is not surprising that a
subsequent decision based upon that rule would garner a similar
misunderstanding and misapplication.
Scalia is careful to point out that Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved
jurisdiction over an absent defendant, and it "stands for nothing more than the
proposition that when the 'minimum contact' that is a substitute for physical
presence consists of property ownership it must, like other minimum contacts,
be related to the litigation." 80 Furthermore, the logic of Shaffer's holding does
not compel the conclusion that physically present nonresidents must be treated
in the same manner as absent ones. The American tradition has treated the two
classes of defendants differently, and it is unreasonable to read Shaffer as
destroying the distinction.81 International Shoe confined its "minimum
contacts" requirement to situations in which the defendant was not served while
present in the forum and nothing in Shaffer expands that requirement. Just as
transient jurisdiction was exempted from the "minimum contacts" standard of
International Shoe, it cannot be held to be incorporated into the standard by a
subsequent decision based upon the general rule.82
76 433 U.S. at 212. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
77 Brief for Petitioner at 16-19, Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S.
604(1990).
78 ee supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
80 495 U.S. at 620.
81 Id. at 621.
82 Id.
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V. TiE RULE OF BURNHAM
It is arguable that the controversy concerning the transient rule of personal
jurisdiction is now moot after Burnham. The Court, although a plurality
opinion, does not hedge when it states that transient personal jurisdiction is
alive and well in the Court's due process decisions. Scalia argues convincingly
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of the American legal system. It
follows that such a time-honored tradition comports with a system that defines
due process as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "83
As a result of Burnham, a state may exercise general in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who is personally served with process
while physically present in the forum state without violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the title of this Note suggests, the
question remains as to whether the Burnham decision is the "final word" in the
transient jurisdiction debate. Is the historical rationale provided by Scalia as
clear as his articulation suggests? It is arguable that the answer to this question
is clearly in the negative considering the amount of scholarly attention the
subject has received.84
The following section discusses the opinions offered by both Justice Scalia
and Justice Brennan. Although the two justices arrived at the same result
concerning transient jurisdiction, their opinions diverge as to the rationale that
supports the rule. Justice Scalia points to the "historical pedigree" as a
sufficient defense for the continuing validity of the transient rule. Justice
Brennan, while agreeing that the Due Process Clause generally permits a state
to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant who is personally served while
voluntarily present in the forum, strongly disagrees that history alone provides
a sufficient justification for the rule.
VI. THE BURNHAM OPINIONS
A. Justice Scalia: The Preservation of Tradition
Justice Scalia's rationale for the absolute constitutionality of the transient
personal jurisdiction rule can be presented in concise form: "Among the most
firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is
that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically
present in the State."85
83 Id. at 618.
84 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
85 495 U.S. at 610.
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Scalia presents personal jurisdiction as a creature of history. According to
Scalia, the courts of many states during the 19th and early 20th centuries firmly
established that personal service upon the physically present defendant
"sufficed to confer jurisdiction, without regard to whether the defendant was
only briefly in the State." 86 Because the practice of transient jurisdiction
comprises the legal tradition of American courts, and the practice has not been
expressly abrogated by the Court, it continues to serve as the bedrock of due
process with respect to personal jurisdiction.8 7
Within his opinion, Justice Scalia provides impressive evidence of the
"historical pedigree" of the transient rule. Although Scalia's journey through
the annals of the American legal tradition and the treatment of transient
jurisdiction is factually correct, evidence does exist that the practice of transient
jurisdiction did not garner the unquestionable support that Scalia suggests. 88
Nevertheless, Scalia takes a hard line on the subject and, in effect, holds that
transient jurisdiction has been held to be due process in the past, it comports
with due process today, and it will continue to be sufficient in the future. In
that vein, Scalia declares that lower court decisions that have held against the
constitutionality of transient jurisdiction should be dismissed as erroneous. 89
B. Justice Brennan: Questioning Tradition
Although agreeing with Scalia in result, Justice Brennan is thoroughly
unconvinced by Justice Scalia's shorthanded, "bright line" treatment of the
transient jurisdiction issue. Brennan does not subscribe to the theory, espoused
by Scalia, that the "historical pedigree" of a jurisdictional rule is the only
factor that must be considered such that "traditional rules of jurisdiction are,
ipso facto, forever constitutional." 90 The jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction
and due process constitutes an area of law particularly inappropriate for the
invocation of "bright line" tests. For Brennan, there are no hard and fast rules
when due process is at issue.91 Furthermore, International Shoe and Shaffer
foreclose Justice Scalia's reliance on "historical pedigree" because it was with
86 I. at 613.
87 Id. at 615.
88 For example, it has been suggested that until the late 19th century, American
appellate courts rarely held transient service sufficient to confer jurisdiction as such. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 292. Furthermore, Justice Brennan points out that the transient
rule did not receive "wide currency" in the United States until well after the Pennoyer
decision. 495 U.S. at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89 495 U.S. at 617.
90 Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91 Id.
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these decisions that the court struck down the traditional "presence"
requirement and quasi in rem procedures firmly entrenched in Pennoyer.92
Rejecting the reliance on history, Brennan suggests that the Court should
make an "independent inquiry into the fairness of [a] prevailing in-state service
rule"93 to insure that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with "contemporary
notions of due process." 94 Although history is relevant in providing notice to
nonresidents voluntarily present in a particular state that they are subject to suit
in the forum, history alone, argues Brennan, cannot serve as the beginning and
the end of the inquiry.95 The "historical pedigree" is but one factor in
determining whether the jurisdiction rule comports with "contemporary"
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Only those jurisdictional rules that
comply with these "contemporary notions" constitute due process. 96
In response, Justice Scalia concedes that the "reasonableness inquiry"
suggested by Brennan must be utilized at the "margins" when states adopt
"non-traditional" methods of obtaining personal jurisdiction. However, such an
inquiry is not required with respect to jurisdiction via in-state service because
physical presence is considered the "very baseline of reasonableness." 97
Given the fact that in-state service of process upon a physically present
defendant appears, after Burnham, to be sufficient to confer jurisdiction in all
cases, the ramifications of this rule in practice become the next logical subject
for debate. How will courts deal with the inevitable unfair results of such a
"catch-as-you-can" method of establishing personal jurisdiction? As the
fairness and reasonableness of the rule come into increasing question, will the
Court be forced to alter the rule to comply with "contemporary" notions of due
process? In other words, is Burnham the "final word" on transient personal
jurisdiction? The following sections provide some insight into these and related
questions.
VII. TRANSIENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A. Fairness and Reasonableness
Given the conclusion that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based solely
upon in-state service comports with due process, the fairness and
reasonableness of such a result in practice remains an issue for debate.98 At
what point should a court turn the focus of the jurisdiction question away from
921d. at 630.
93 Id. at 629.
94Id. at 633.
95 Id. at 635.
96 Id. at 630.
97 ld. at 627.
98 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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strict adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment to focus upon the issue of
fairness to the nonresident defendant? Is it likely that due process and fairness
will become competing values?
As with any measurement of fairness, an estimate as to the fairness element
of a given exercise of transient jurisdiction depends upon the point of view of
the person charged with making such an estimate. From the nonresident
defendant's perspective, it appears unequivocally unfair to be forced to defend
in a forum with which the nonresident has no contacts other than being served
with process during a fleeting "presence" in the jurisdiction. By simply
inserting a few hundred miles between the forum and the defendant's domicile,
one can markedly enhance the defendant's feeling of unfair treatment.
An illustration of the possible fairness issues inherent in the transient
jurisdiction rule further illuminates the nonresident defendant's predicament.
Assume that D is a life-long resident of Anchorage, Alaska. D has never had
cause to leave the State of Alaska because her struggling oil refinery business
requires constant attention. Assume further that the proverbial "chance of a
lifetime" comes D's way. A buyer from El Petro, a producer of petroleum-
based solvents located in Caracas, Venezuela, has expressed an interest in
purchasing large quantities of D's refined crude oil. The buyer insists that D
travel to Caracas to close the deal. Reasoning that such a deal could breathe
new life into her refinery's plummeting sales figures, D departs for Caracas to
meet with the buyer.
D's flight itinerary requires a fifteen minute stop over at Miami
International Airport. D assumes that the stop over will merely constitute a
fifteen minute delay in an otherwise advantageous journey. Unfortunately, D's
assumption is entirely incorrect. While the jet is refueling on the airport
tarmac, D is personally served by a Dade County deputy sheriff with a
summons and complaint to appear in county court to answer a wrongful
discharge complaint. The complaint was filed by E, a disgruntled former
employee who has, within the last six months, relocated from Anchorage to
Miami.99 As a result, D's fifteen minute "presence" in the State of Florida will
consume a disproportionate share of her time and resources in the ensuing
months.
Aside from the obvious inequities of D's plight, the typical nonresident
defendant is faced with a Hobson's choice between travelling many miles to a
faraway forum and expending an inordinate amount of time and money in
defending the action, or, in the alternative, suffering a default judgment. 10 The
mere fact that a defendant is forced to defend in a foreign jurisdiction with
99 See generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Grace v. MacArthur, 170
F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (nonresident defendant served while flying over jurisdiction
in commercial aircraft).
100 Posnak, supra note 4, at 744.
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which the nonresident has little or no contacts results in a measure of unfairness
regardless of the forum's geographic location.
Although analogous to unfairness, unreasonable results of the transient rule
are also a concern among commentators.10 1 Professor Matz recently described
the unreasonableness inherent in the transient rule. Among the effects of
requiring nonresidents to defend in remote forums are: (1) the transient forum
may adopt a choice of law rule that would be particularly or uniquely unfair to
the defendant; (2) defendants may be fraudulently induced to enter the forum
state;1°2 (3) the state asserting jurisdiction may have no interest in the outcome
of the litigation;10 3 and (4) the benefits that nonresidents derive from a transient
presence in the forum state are significantly outweighed by the burdens of
defending in the forum. 1 4
In response, those who advance the virtues of the transient rule testify to
the reasonableness of the doctrine. Examples of often recited reasonable results
include: (1) the transient jurisdiction doctrine is a predictable rule upon which
all parties can rely; (2) being served with process and becoming subject to the
jurisdiction of the forum is a justifiable risk that nonresidents assume upon
entering the state; (3) nonresidents derive benefit from the protection of the
laws of the forum while present in the state, and thus, should be subject to the
jurisdiction of those laws;10 5 and (4) in the majority of cases, the nonresident
defendant will have at least "minimum contacts" with the state in which the
defendant is personally served without resort to service as the sole basis for
jurisdiction. 1 6
Insight into the persuasiveness of the arguments expounding the
reasonableness of the transient rule can be gained by re-examining the plight of
D, our hypothetical nonresident defendant. Perhaps the most persuasive of the
arguments endorsing the reasonableness of the transient rule is the
benefit/burden analysis. The benefit/burden rationale maintains that because the
nonresident derives benefits in the form of police, fire, and related protection
while present in the state, it is reasonable that the nonresident suffer the burden
101 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
102 A general rule of due process within the transient jurisdiction doctrine requires that
the defendant be voluntarily within the forum. Concerning the effects of fraudulently
inducing the nonresident to enter the forum, see infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
103 The lack of local interest in the outcome of the litigation takes on a special
significance with respect to the docrine of forum non conveniens. See infra notes 121-24
and accompanying text.
104 See Matz, supra note 5, at 700.
105 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
106 See Bernstine, supra note 4, at 61.
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of becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the state's judicial system.10 7 As with
all benefit/burden analysis, a proper judgment can only be derived by a process
of weighing the relative benefits and burdens. Presumably, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant will appear reasonable only
when the benefits equal or exceed the burdens. Returning to D, one can
scarcely reconcile the benefits D derived during a fifteen minute presence at a
Florida airport with the enormous burdens D will encounter in defending a suit
in a forum thousands of miles away from her Alaskan domicile. Therefore, it
would appear that the benefit/burden rationale would not yield a reasonable
result in our hypothetical scenario.
Further application of the arguments supporting the reasonableness of the
transient rule to our hypothetical fact pattern yield similarly unreasonable
results. It is difficult to argue with any conviction that D assumed a justifiable
risk of being served with process and becoming subject to the jurisdiction of
Florida courts by making a stop-over in a Florida airport, a decision over
which D had little or no control. A more convincing proposition is that D was
not voluntarily present in the state when served and to exercise jurisdiction
over her would be unreasonable even under the Burnham rule.108 Furthermore,
it is probable that the State of Florida would possess little more than a
negligible interest in the outcome of the litigation involving a tortious injury
caused in Alaska and filed by a plaintiff who has himself been present within
the state a mere six months. In fairness, however, it must be recognized that
our hypothetical exercise of transient jurisdiction is based upon an
extraordinary fact pattern. Arguably, the majority of the cases would not
involve such manifest unfairness and the exercise of transient personal
jurisdiction would be, on most accounts, reasonable. Nevertheless, by
examining the worst-case scenarios, one begins to recognize the potential
problems inherent in the transient rule.
With respect to the fairness and reasonableness of the exercise of transient
jurisdiction, convincing arguments can be made on both sides of the issue. The
conflicts on the issue result in large part from one's point of view.
Nonresidents find the rule inherently unfair and unreasonable. Predictably,
plaintiffs espouse the virtues of the rule. Most courts, citing both precedent and
policy, find at the very least the rule comports with due process, and, in
practice, results in fair and reasonable outcomes in general.
The following sections suggest methods for mitigating the possible unfair
and unreasonable results of the transient rule. First, a survey of the remaining
due process challenges to the exercise of transient jurisdiction is provided.
107 Justice Brennan discusses the importance of the benefit/burden analogy with
respect to "contemporary notions" of due process and the transient rule. See 495 U.S. at
638 (Brennan, I., concurring).
108 See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (voluntary presence requirement).
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Second, the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens is introduced as an
increasingly powerful device for insuring fair and reasonable results after
Burnham. Finally, given the expanded role of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, the final section advances the proposition that Burnham is not the
Court's "last word" respecting transient personal jurisdiction.
B. Enduring Burnham: The Technical Requirements of Transient
Personal Jurisdiction
Following the Court's decision in Burnham, both nonresident defendants
and their attorneys must confront the transient jurisdiction rule as the
undisputed law in American jurisdictions. Faced with this reality, nonresident
defendants must construct arguments to mitigate the effects of the rule. The
most elementary challenges to the exercise of personal jurisdiction are based
solely upon in-state service and can be derived from assessing the technical, or
due process, requirements of the rule. These requirements include: (1) proper
service of process; (2) personal, "in-hand" service; and (3) voluntary presence
in the state.
An unyielding prerequisite of obtaining jurisdiction based solely on in-state
service is proper service of process. Due process requires that the defendant be
given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in the cause filed against
her. 109 Traditionally, in personam jurisdiction required that the defendant be
personally served. As unscrupulous defendants began to routinely thwart
plaintiffs by avoiding personal service in the jurisdiction, states began to create
methods of substitute service of process, including service by mail and leaving
process papers at the defendant's dwelling. 10 However, the exercise of
jurisdiction based solely on in-state service of process requires that the
defendant be personally served while present in the state. The various forms of
substitute service developed by states after Pennoyer, although adequate for
jurisdiction based on more than mere presence, will not satisfy the due process
requirement for purposes of transient jurisdiction. The transient defendant must
be personally served, in-hand, while present in the state. If the service of
process does not comply with this requirement, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant will violate due process. Therefore,
an attorney representing the nonresident defendant would be well advised to
scrutinize the mechanics involved in service of process upon his or her client.
Once the nonresident defendant's counsel has determined that the client has
been personally served with proper notice while present within the state, a
series of other "mechanical" questions must be answered. The attorney must
examine the circumstances surrounding the nonresident's presence in the state.
109 CAsAD, supra note 4, at § 2.03.
110 See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
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For example, why was the client present in the state at the time process was
served? Was the client voluntarily present in the state, or was the client coaxed
or persuaded into entering the state? If the client was so persuaded, was such
persuasion fraudulent? If the nonresident's counsel is inclined to challenge the
state's exercise of transient personal jurisdiction over his or her client, the
answers to these questions become critical.
American courts have developed several doctrines of self-restraint
concerning the exercise of personal jurisdiction. For purposes of this section
concerning the technical requirements of the transient rule, the self-restraining
doctrines respecting service of process are of central concern. One example is
the doctrine of immunity from service of process. A nonresident who is present
within the forum state for the purpose of participating in legal proceedings
enjoys a general immunity from the effective service of process in other causes
of action for a reasonable time before and after the actual time of the
proceedings.111 The immunity applies not only to parties, but also to witnesses
and attorneys. 112 Almost all American jurisdictions recognize the immunity,
and the principle is sometimes embodied in statutes. 113 Therefore, if the
nonresident is present in the forum for purposes of attending another
proceeding, service of process during the reasonable immunity period would be
ineffective and, as a consequence, the court would be unable to exercise
transient jurisdiction over the nonresident.
If counsel for a nonresident defendant cannot take refuge in the immunity
from service doctrine in challenging transient jurisdiction, another judicial self-
restraint doctrine may be available. If the plaintiff has induced the nonresident
into coming within the state for the purpose of serving him there, the service of
"I CAsAD, supra note 4, at §1.06; JAMES & HAZARD, CIvIL PROcEDuRE, § 2.28
(3d ed. 1985); Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128
(1916). Professor Casad points to two policy rationales for the immunity from service
doctrine:
Arrest of a party, witness, judge, juror, or attorney involved in an ongoing lawsuit
would seriously disrupt the proceedings, and so the common law granted those
participants immunity from service in connection with other actions while they were so
engaged. The principal justification for the doctrine was the need to protect the court
from interference. [An additional justification was the] need to encourage the presence
in the territory of persons necessary to the trial of a lawsuit whose attendance could not
be compelled.
CASAD, supra note 4, at § 1.06.
112 See generally, Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Crusco v. Strunk Steel
Co., 74 A.2d 142, 143 (Pa. 1950).
113 CASAD, supra note 4, at § 1.06.
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process may be avoided. 114 After Burnham, it is quite possible that plaintiffs
will be more inclined to rely upon in-state service as a method of obtaining
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants because the transient method
incontrovertibly comports with due process. 115 Therefore, as the prospect of
personally serving the nonresident in-state becomes more attractive, the
incentive for "persuading" the nonresident to enter the forum state is increased.
If, however, the defendant challenges the exercise of transient jurisdiction by
establishing that the plaintiff has fraudulently induced the defendant into
entering the state, not only will the service of process be ineffective, but the
court will not have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant as a result.1 16
114 See Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Western States Refining
Co. v. Berry, 313 P.2d 480 (Utah 1957); Economy Elec. Co. v. Automatice Elec. Power &
Light Plant, 118 S.E. 3, 4 (S.C. 1923); RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCr OF LAWS
§ 82.
115 Professor Casad notes a similar phenomenon after Pennoyer.
Under the traditional view of jurisdiction . . . physical presence of the
defendant within the territory of the forum was regarded as a sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction. This fact was sometimes exploited by plaintiffs who would
use reprehensible measures to induce the defendant to enter the forum territory.
Sometimes plaintiffs would lure the defendants into the territory by fraudulent
representations or by tricks or artifice. To nullify the incentives for employing
such devices, the courts developed a doctrine to avoid jurisdiction in cases where
personal service on the defendant was obtained through force or fraud.
CASAD, supra note 4, at § 1.05. For further examples of the fraud doctrine, see Blandin v.
Ostrander, 239 F. 700 (2d Cir. 1917); Mallin v. Sunshine Kitchens, Inc., 314 So.2d 203
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Phares v. Nutter, 609 P.2d 561 (Ariz. 1980); Annotation, Attack
on Personal Service as Having Been Obtained by Fraud or Trickery, 98 A.L.R.2d 551
(1964).
116 Professor Casad has traced the development of the fraud doctrine and suggests that
two different rules were recognized. Some courts viewed the use of force or fraud for
purposes of service of process as destroying jurisdiction. Without personal jurisdiction, any
resulting judgment would be regarded as void and could be collaterally attacked by the
defendant. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937). Other courts, however,
viewed the effect of such fraudulent exploits, not as destroying jurisdiction, but as providing
grounds for the court to decline the exercise of transient jurisdiction over the defendant:
If the defendant objected to the service and the exercise of jurisdiction based
upon it, the court would quash the service and dismiss the action against the
defendant. If the defendant failed to object, however, and a default judgment was
rendered, the judgment would be valid unless set aside or reversed through a
direct attack.
CAsAD, supra note 4, at §1.06.
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Returning to the quandary of D, our hypothetical nonresident defendant, it
appears that neither the "mechanical," due process requirements of transient
jurisdiction, nor the aforementioned self-restraint doctrines will be of any
assistance. D 's predicament is not unlike that of the average nonresident
challenging the exercise of transient jurisdiction. Like D, most nonresidents
will be personally served with adequate notice while present in the state.
Furthermore, the majority of nonresidents will be unable to take refuge in the
immunity from service shelter, if only for the fact that most plaintiffs' attorneys
will be aware of immunity when tracking down the nonresident defendant.
Additionally, only in the exceptional cases will the defendant be able to avoid
jurisdiction based upon the fraudulent inducement of the plaintiff. Finally, any
attacks upon the constitutionality of the transient rule have been, at least for the
present time, foreclosed by Burham. Therefore, D and other similarly situated
nonresident defendants must look elsewhere to successfully attack the exercise
of transient jurisdiction.
The following section examines the most powerful judicial self-restraint
doctrine available to the nonresident defendant subjected to the harsh
consequences of the transient jurisdiction rule. Nonresidents unable to attack
the exercise of jurisdiction itself may be able to attack the plaintiff's choice of
forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. After Burnham, it is likely
that the forum non conveniens doctrine will assume the role that the "minimum
contacts" standard played before Burnham.
C. Forn Non Conveniens: The Exception or the Rule
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens asserts the
discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it possesses
in a given case when the court determines that the plaintiff's chosen forum
would be seriously inconvenient to the defendant.1 17 In the early twentieth
century, the doctrine was inhospitably received by American courts whose
decisions reflected the view that courts have a duty to exercise jurisdiction
whenever it is properly acquired. 118 Forum non conveniens began to enjoy
general acceptance after its adoption by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert.119 Today, Gulf Oil is regarded as the leading case on the
doctrine and serves as the standard to which judges look for guidance in
exercising their discretion in ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss due to
117 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929); Edward L.
Barrett, The Doctrine of Forwn Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV. 380 (1947).
118 Barrett, supra note 117, at 394-97.
119 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In stating the general rule, the court held that "[tlhe principle
of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." Id. at 507.
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inconvenient forum.1 20 As a general proposition, the courts of one state may
not transfer cases to courts of another state. Therefore, dismissal is the only
device for implementing forum non conveniens in the typical transient
jurisdiction situation. 121
In Gulf Oil, the Court spelled out the multitude of factors to be weighed in
determining whether the plaintiff's chosen forum is unreasonably inconvenient.
The Court divided the factors into those concerning the private interests of the
litigant and factors related to the interests of the public. 122 Those considerations
grouped under the private interests of the litigants include: (1) the accessibility
to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to subpoena
unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining willing witnesses; (4) the
feasibility of jury views when appropriate to the litigation; (5) the practical
problems that make a trial expensive, complicated, and burdensome; and (6)
the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. Among the factors of public
interest to be considered are: (1) the administrative difficulties of congested
litigation centers; (2) imposing the burden of jury duty upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation; (3) the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) conflict of laws
120 Although not generally so limited, forum non conveniens is generally invoked on
the defendant's motions. Because plaintiffs are free to choose the jurisdiction in which to file
an action, they usually have no incentive to challenge the appropriateness of the forum.
Some states, however, hold that issue may be addressed on the court's motion. CASAD,
supra note 4, at §1.04.
121 JAMEs & HAZARD, supra note 111, at 107. Contrasted with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is the venue principle. Most state courts operate under venue statutes that
direct the litigation to a court within the state where the case can be litigated most
conveniently and efficiently. Professor Casad has noted that "no procedure presently exists
for transferring the action from one state court to another; if the alternative forum is in
another state, the action is normally dismissed in the first court, leaving the plaintiff to
commence a new suit in another state." CAsAD, supra note 4, at §1.04. For an examination
of the procedures for protecting the interests of the plaintiff on dismissal, see infra note 125
and accompanying text.
122 Professors James and Hazard agree that the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens represents two strains of policy:
One is the state's interest in protecting its citizens and taxpayers from the
undue expense and congestion that may flow from burdening its courts with
litigation having no connection with the state. The other is the parties' interest in
having litigation between them processed conveniently and in a way most likely to
yield a just result.
JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 111, at 105.
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problems that arise when a court is forced to apply the law of another state. 123
The Gulf Oil Court cautioned lower courts that "unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed." 124
In the typical transient jurisdiction case, the plaintiff will choose a forum
within a state where the nonresident defendant can be easily served. As was
presented in our hypothetical illustration, the plaintiff will often choose to
"catch" the nonresident in the plaintiff's state of residence. By consenting to
the jurisdiction of another state, however, the plaintiff is capable of serving the
defendant in a most inconvenient locale. 125 In either circumstance, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens can serve as a powerful tool to counter the plaintiff's
choice of an inconvenient forum. Even in situations in which the Gulf Oil
factors weigh heavily in favor of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
is not without recourse. Courts have traditionally protected the plaintiff against
the running of statutes of limitations and against countering personal
jurisdiction objections in the new court by conditioning the dismissal upon the
defendant's waiver of those defenses. 126
Returning to D, our nonresident defendant, a clear understanding of the
forum non conveniens doctrine can be obtained by applying the aforementioned
rules to D's predicament. As with many instances of transient jurisdiction, the
cause of action in D's case arose outside the forum state. All of the facts and
circumstances surrounding E's tort action for wrongful discharge occurred in
Alaska while E was an Alaska resident. Presumably, all evidence of the
discharge and any necessary witnesses will also be located thousands of miles
from the forum. As a result, the "accessibility to sources of proof" factor will
weigh heavily in favor of D's motion to dismiss. In addition, the costs of trying
123 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 512. But see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981) (choice of law should not be given weight). An important consideration that was not
cited by the Gulf Oil Court is the availability of an alternative forum. Most courts that
recognize forum non conveniens in appropriate cases will not exercise their discretion when
dismissal will deprive the plaintiff of the only available forum or when there is substantial
doubt whether any other forum is practically available. See JAMEs & HAZARD, supra note
111, at 107. See also Note, Reqidrement of a Second Forn for Application of Forun Non
Conveniens, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1199 (1959).
124 Gulf Oi!, 330 U.S. at 517.
125 JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 111, at § 2.22.
126 See, e.g., Miskow v. Boeing Co., 664 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1981); Mizokami Bros.
of Ariz. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1981); Adriana Dev. Corp. v.
Gaspar, 81 A.D.2d 235 (1981); Harrsion v. Wyeth Lab. Div. of Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Other alternatives are available to the court seeking to
provide some protection to the plaintiff. For example, some courts, instead of dismissing,
stay the current proceeding until the new action is commenced in the alternative forum.
CASAD, supra note 4, at § 1.04; see, e.g., Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 131 A.2d 39,
affid, 135 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1957); Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 544 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1976).
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a "transient" action in Florida in terms of legal fees, transportation, discovery,
lost time, and related expenses will be unreasonably exorbitant. Furthermore,
the interests of the State of Florida in the outcome of the litigation are de
minimis. 127 Because E's cause of action arose within, and substantially relates
to, the State of Alaska, the state courts of Florida would be required to apply
Alaska law to the substantive issues of the case. 128
Weighing both the private interests of the parties and the public interest of
the forum state in the litigation, it appears that our hypothetical transient
jurisdiction scenario is a prime candidate for dismissal upon D's forum non
conveniens motion. It is probable that the Florida court would exercise its
discretion and refuse to exercise its otherwise valid transient jurisdiction over
D. Provided an alternative forum is available, the court would dismiss E's
cause of action subject to D's waiver of any jurisdictional or statute of
limitations defenses. E would then be free to pursue his cause of action against
D in a more appropriate forum.
At this point, one must note the ironic similarities between the balancing
that accompanies a motion for dismissal due to forum non conveniens and the
"minimum contacts" standard of International Shoe. 129 As the Burnham Court
made great strides toward unequivocal approval of transient personal
jurisdiction, will the doctrine of forum non conveniens succeed where the
"minimum contacts" standard failed in uprooting the rule? As one begins to
turn one's focus away from the constitutional considerations of the transient
rule and, instead, to focus upon the practical fairness and reasonableness of the
rule, one realizes that forum non conveniens could serve to destroy the
foundation that the Burnham Court sought to preserve. As fairness and due
process become competing values under the transient rule, will courts turn to
discretionary doctrines such as forum non conveniens and refuse to exercise
what the Burnham decision unabashedly announces as being "among the most
firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition?" 130
As the inequities inherent in the transient rule become more prevalent
because disgruntled plaintiffs increasingly take advantage of the rule to "catch"
unwary nonresidents, defendants will likewise come to rely upon the doctrine
of forum non conveniens for relief.131 State court judges will be forced to
127 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
128 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 567 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Barker v. Anderson, 546 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
RFSTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFucr OF LAWS, §§ 145-46 (1969).
129 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. C. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 501
(1947).
13 0 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
131 Such was the case even after Pennoyer
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entertain an escalating number of nonresident defendants' motions to dismiss. It
is likely that an entire subclass of forum non conveniens jurisprudence will
develop as courts continue in their effort to sort out the harsh results of the
Burnham rule. Courts will be continually called upon to exercise their
discretion by nonresidents who rely not upon the Court's decisions in
International Shoe or Shaffer, but upon the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Judges will no longer be able to look to the due process decisions
of the Court for guidance because Burnham is the rule. 132 The question will
not be one of personal jurisdiction, but one of equity.
The following section continues the examination of the role that forum non
conveniens will play in post-Burnham personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. In
addition, several questions that remain unanswered after the Burnham decision
are probed. Finally, the proposition is advanced that Burnham is not the
Court's last word on transient personal jurisdiction.
VII. THE FINAL WORD?
After Burnham, it is probable that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
will assume the position once held by International Shoe and Shaffer among the
critics of transient jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the factors utilized by
courts with respect to forum non conveniens balancing are remarkably similar
to the factors relevant to "minimum contacts" analysis. It is ironic that the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens will allow a court to do just
what the Burnham decision will not; namely, to refuse to exercise personal
jurisdiction based upon inadequate contacts with the forum state. The Burnham
decision announced that in-state service of process upon a nonresident
defendant is sufficient to confer jurisdiction regardless of the quantity or quality
of the defendant's contacts with the state. 133 The doctrine of forum non
conveniens allows a court, within its discretion, to refuse to exercise such
jurisdiction when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are so attenuated
that forcing the nonresident to defend in the forum would be unreasonably
burdensome. Therefore, although the court is prohibited from relying upon
[I]f the plaintiff was thus to be compensated by the new transient rule for
some inconvenience caused to him by the Pennoyer requirement, the doctrine of
the inconvenient forum was in turn resorted to in order to give the defendant
protection against some of the hardship this rule caused him. The common law
and common sense jurisdiction of the forum conveniens yielded to a dogmatic rule
of personal service precariously balanced by a doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 292.
132 Of course, judges will then turn to Gulf Ol for guidance in exercising their
discretion whether to decline jurisdiction plainly established under Burnhwn.
133 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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"minimum contacts" analysis when ruling upon the validity of transient
jurisdiction, the court is required to rely upon such contacts when ruling upon
the defendant's forum non conveniens motion.
The dichotomy is further complicated by the fact that forum non
conveniens is a doctrine of judicial discretion. On appeal, a court's denial of
personal jurisdiction is an issue of law subject to full review by the appellate
court. Conversely, a court's decision to dismiss due to inconvenient forum is
discretionary and, as such, may only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. 134 Reviewing courts are loath to question the discretion of the trial
courts and will do so only in cases of clear abuse. Therefore, the court's refusal
to exercise otherwise appropriate jurisdiction is given more protection from
appellate scrutiny than the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction in the first
place.
The proposition that judges will freely exercise their discretion and grant
dismissals based upon forum non conveniens when presented with the gross
inequities of the transient rule negates most of the positive elements of the rule.
The virtue of the transient rule most often cited by its supporters is its stability.
The fact that personal in-state service confers jurisdiction over the defendant
constitutes a rule upon which all parties can rely. By injecting the doctrine of
forum non conveniens into the formula, however, this stable and
uncontroverted rule is transformed into a maxim dictated by the discretion of a
trial judge. By shifting the focus away from precedent and toward judicial
discretion, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is capable of rendering the
rule of transient jurisdiction as uncertain as the "minimum contacts" analysis
the Burnham Court sought to preclude. 135
With the increased prospects for circumventing the transient rule offered by
forum non conveniens, one must ask why the Burnham Court endorsed the rule
at all? Would it not be more efficient for the trial court to analyze the
defendant's contacts with the forum before establishing jurisdiction rather than
reviewing those contacts in declining to exercise a possessed jurisdiction?
Should a trial court hold such power guided only by a judge's sense of equity
and a laundry list of obscure factors provided in Gulf Oil?. Justice Scalia's
answer is that the traditions of American law, predating Pennoyer, and the due
process decisions of the Supreme Court mandate such a dilemma.
The question left unanswered by the Burnham Court serves as the focus of
this Note. Is Burnham the Court's final word on the rule of transient personal
jurisdiction? Given the possibility of unreasonable results under the rule
illustrated by D's hypothetical plight, the increasing reliance upon the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as a counterbalance, and the Court's progression of
personal jurisdiction decisions, it is likely that the Court will be forced to re-
134 See JAMEs & HAZARD, supra note 111, at § 12.4.
135 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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evaluate transient jurisdiction in the future. As the unreasonable outcomes of
the transient rule become more prevalent, due process and fairness to the
nonresident defendant will become competing considerations. Although, after
Burnham, a trial court must recognize that transient jurisdiction comports with
due process, the court may side with fairness to the defendant and refuse to
exercise such jurisdiction. Professor Ehrenzweig prophesied to that effect:
Once [the doctrine] has been deprived of its vitality either by a decision
overruling it or by the continuing erosion by exceptions, the primary reason
for the continued existence of the transient rule will have disappeared. Forum
non conveniens, which now allows discretionary refusal to "take" existing
jurisdiction, may then assume the positive function of identifying the forum
convendens in terms of substantial contacts such as the plaintiff's residence, the
origin of the cause of action or the presence of property. 136
IX. CONCLUSION
Following the Burnham Court's announcement that transient jurisdiction
comports with due process in all respects, it is likely that debate concerning the
rule will turn away from its constitutionality and toward its effects. As the
inequities of the rule become more widespread, state courts will begin to
exercise their discretion via common law doctrines such as forum non
conveniens to protect the nonresident defendant. Additionally, astute attorneys
will formulate increasingly creative challenges to the application of the rule.
Whether the Court will be called upon to overrule the transient rule depends in
large part upon the results under the rule in the aftermath of Burnham. Relying
upon the "historical pedigree" provided by Scalia, it is apparent the rule has
been valid for many decades and will presumably remain so in the near future.
The willingness of the Court to abrogate the rule in a future decision as no
longer complying with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
may be foreshadowed by Justice Brennan's concurrence:
[The fact] that we were willing in Shaffer to examine anew the appropriateness
of the quasi in rem rule---until that time dutifully accepted by American courts
for at least a century-demonstrates that we did not believe that the "pedigree"
of ajurisdictional practice was dispositive in deciding whether it was consistent
with due process.... If we could discard an "ancient form without substantial
modem justification" in Shaffer, we can do so again. 137
Scott D. Irwin
136 Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 312.
137 495 U.S. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Scalia was also open
to the possibility of abrogating the transient rule in the future: "Nothing we say today
prevents individual states from limiting or entirely abandoning the in-state service basis of
jurisdiction." Id. at 627.
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